






















                                            
1 It can of course also be found in canonical philosophy of science: see for example Oppenheimer and Putnam 
[1958]. 
2 Cameron [2008], p1. 
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orderings, the assumption is that ODRs constitute well­founded partial orderings.3  Thus, to take an example, if one takes supervenience relations with properties as their relata to constitute ODRs, the intuition is that there must exist a set of properties on which all other properties supervene, but that are not themselves supervenient upon anything.4  Or if it is mereological relations with objects as their relata that constitute the ODRs in question, the intuition is that there must exist a set of objects that are sufficient to compose everything but that do not themselves have any proper parts.  Underpinning this intuition is the “anti‐gunk worry” that in a ‘gunky’ world in which every object has proper parts,    composition could never have got off the ground. If the existence of each complex object depends for its existence on the existence of the complex objects at the level below, and if we never reach a bottom level, then it is hard to see why there are any complex objects at all…  In Schaffer’s charming phrase, ‘Being would be infinitely deferred, never achieved’.5  The ‘worry’ is presumably analogous for any other ODRs one might identify.    The second assumption is that, whether conceived of as populated by objects or by properties, the fundamental basis is physical in nature.  The most familiar contemporary proponent of this thought is probably David Lewis, who sees it as “a task of physics to provide an inventory of all the fundamental properties and relations that occur” in an assumed fundamental supervenience basis for this world.6  The belief that it is physics’ job to fill in the details of this basis is a pervasive one: Kim for example observes that “the bottom level is usually thought to consist of elementary particles, or whatever our 
                                            
3 For example Schaffer ([2003], p500) “assume[s] that the priority relations among actual concrete objects form 
a well-founded partial ordering… Well-foundedness is imposed by requiring that all priority claims terminate.”  
4 That supervenience relations do qualify as dependence relations is a matter of dispute.  I will touch on this 
again below. 
5 Cameron [2007], p.6.  The word ‘gunk’ as a term for objects all of whose parts themselves have proper parts 
was introduced by David Lewis in his [1991]. 




                                            
7 Kim [1998], p15.  
8 It should be noted that Schaffer is not deploying his argument in favour of the idea that there is no fundamental 
level at all – cf. footnote 3 above.  Given that his work since that publication has been primarily to argue for his 
‘priority monism’, we can take the intention behind his argument to be to ‘butter up’ philosophers to the notion 
of grounding from above.  Since I take it that fundamentality questions ought not to be settled a priori but 
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with facts and observations of various sorts, Schaffer’s argument is easy to summarize: it is (what we might call) a meta‐induction, and in a nutshell it is this.   The history of science is a history of seeking ever‐deeper structure.  We have gone from ‘the elements’ to ‘the atoms’ to the subatomic electrons, protons and neutrons, to the zoo of ‘elementary particles’, to thinking that the hadrons are built out of quarks […] Should one not expect the future to be like the past?9  In other words, the fact that progress in the study of matter has largely consisted of instances of fractioning entities thought to be fundamental into the more fundamental entities they are dependent upon is being claimed to furnish an argument that it is better in keeping with the history of physics to deny the existence of a fundamental level. The claim seems to be that we have good inductive and naturalistic grounds for denying, in particular, mereological fundamentality, though this presumably has implications for fundamentality theses that are cashed out in supervenience‐based or nomological terms.10  It should be immediately clear that if Schaffer’s argument succeeds, it will be a remarkable result.  The question of the infinite divisibility of matter was after all one of Kant’s antinomies.  A clear demonstration that one should not believe in fundamental entities would dismantle an edifice of prevalent contemporary (and ancient) metaphysical thinking in strikingly succinct terms.  And there are some who believe that 
                                                                                                                                        
should be a matter, if possible, for empirical enquiry, I certainly would not take any perceived lack of a basis 
‘beneath’ to be evidence for one ‘above’.   
9 Schaffer [2003], p.503. Note that the examples he chooses are not all on a par: that the relationship between ‘the elements’ and ‘the atoms’ is compositional in anything like the sense that atoms are composed of nuclei and electrons is far from clear.  But we will not pursue this here. 10 Callender [2001] notes his misgivings about the fact that Schaffer’s discussion concerns particles and compositional relations.  This, Callender feels, is illegitimate on the grounds that the ‘fundamental particles’ are today conceived of as fields, and that although fields are “in some sense infinitely divisible”, 
they are only “horizontally” so.  But it seems to me that this objection has, as it stands, yet to be fully made out: after all, particle physics does apparently recognise a distinction between fundamental and composite fields (insofar as, for example, there is currently an open question in “beyond the Standard model” physics of whether the Higgs field ought to be regarded as fundamental or as a composite of top quarks).   But note too that Callender himself recommends that we be charitable and understand Schaffer’s 
argument ‘loosely’ in less contentious, supervenience-based terms, and the argument I will adduce against 
Schaffer applies equally to such a construal. 
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it does succeed.  Though citing discomfiture with certain of Schaffer’s assumptions, Ladyman and Ross are tentatively supportive of the spirit of Schaffer’s proposal, citing that   Arguably we do have inductive grounds for denying that there is a fundamental level since every time one has been posited, it has turned out not to be fundamental after all.11  But I would not recommend that we join this club.  However appealing though it may be, and though it should certainly give the fundamentalist pause, Schaffer’s argument nevertheless fails to exemplify the naturalistic approach we seek.  To cite a first problem (and one that Callender has highlighted), it is surely stretching the inductive evidence  – a handful of cases – beyond breaking point to take it to support the in principle infinite amount of work that the argument needs it to do.12  One may also get the feeling that there is something suspiciously question‐begging about Schaffer’s use of the evidence.13  But while these both represent grave problems for Schaffer’s whole approach, there is in fact a more pertinent and structural difficulty with it from a naturalistic point of view.  Consider again the picture that Schaffer is offering us.  It is a picture in which that which was thought to be fundamental is revealed as being in truth dependent upon other things.  Again and again the fundamental basis changes, but what remains the same throughout is the nature of the dependence relation connecting the various levels, and 
                                            
11 Ladyman and Ross [2007], p178.    
12 Callender [2001] p3. 
13 This is not just Schaffer’s problem: any historico-inductive argument aimed at establishing a fundamentality 






                                            
14 A classic paper on this is Teller [1986].  Note that it is controversial as to whether supervenience constitutes 
a genuine dependence relation; I myself in fact do not believe this, largely on the basis of Kim’s criticisms (Kim 
[1993]). However, it is part of Kim’s argument that supervenience and dependence are nevertheless “not entirely 
independent, for it seems that the following is true: for there to be property dependence there must be property 
covariation.” (ibid. p148).  If this is correct, it follows that the failure of supervenience in this case may be taken 
to indicate the absence of a dependence relation – and one that would have been expected classically.   
15 Such an approach in a sense simply parallels the principal argument cited for committing to fundamental 
entities, namely, that our best current physics supports it.  According to the ‘internalist’ approach  we should 
likewise deny commitment to fundamental entities when and only when our best theories recommend it. In the 
absence of clairvoyance, and given the difficulties expanded upon in note (13) above, I believe this is all we can 




                                            
16 See Cao and Schweber [1993] for a discussion of the concepts involved in an effective field theory, and the 
outlines of an argument as to how this new approach may support anti-fundamentalist conclusions.  I hope to 
discuss my own interpretation of Cao and Schweber’s argument, and a partial defence of it, in a companion 
paper. 
17 See for example Rickles [2011], section 3.2; Castellani [2009].   
18 This is also sometimes known as the ‘bootstrap theory’ of strong interactions. 
19 Of course, the study of S-matrix theory may be valuable for other reasons, particularly given that it was this 
programme that gave rise to string theory.   
20 Schaffer  [2003], p500.  I stress that with the term ‘mereological’, I do not for a moment wish to connote a 
commitment to any a priori theory of composition, such as a philosophical theory with ‘fusion’ and an a priori 
prescription on logical form - quite the opposite in fact, for below I will attempt to extract the appropriate logic 
of part-whole relations from the S-matrix’s own assumptions.    Furthermore, we should note that since the S-
matrix theory concerns only the strongly interacting particles, it has nothing to say on the existence of 
fundamental particles of any other sort (such as leptons); however, the existence of even a proper subset of 
objects for which the ‘chains of dependence’ do not terminate is sufficient to refute the idea that the world 





                                            
21 Cushing [1990] is the canonical source for extended discussion of the background to the S-matrix theory and 
its subsequent developments.   A more condensed discussion of the mathematical and dynamical essentials of 
the theory, as well as its origin and ultimate demise, may be found in Redhead [2005].     
22 Stapp notes that “general quantum theory makes no predictions beyond those made by S-matrix theory” 








                                            
23 Chew, [1968] p763. 
24 String theory, which issued from S-matrix theory, arguably retains this ‘principle theory’ approach.   
25 In expounding this theory I rely mainly on expositions from Chew and the textbook of Collins and Squires.  
There may therefore be concern that the presentation provided here is somewhat biased.  However, since the 
philosophical conclusions I wish to draw from this theory primarily issue from the unitarity postulate and the 
analyticity postulates (one more is to be introduced below), and these are keystones of the theory as a whole and 
not tied to any particular presentation of it, I do not think that these choices materially affect my conclusions.  
However, an alternative and comprehensive presentation of the technical issues relevant to this paper may be 






                                            
26Collins and Squires [1968], p7. 
27 Chew [1971a], p141. 
28 Though there is some connection with analyticity and ‘the principle of causality’, it is inapplicable here. 
There is a well-known classical connection between analyticity and the idea that scattered processes cannot 
happen before the particles are initially brought together. However, the problem with the derivation of this 
relationship is that it must assume both that the wave packets that represent quantum particles are localized and 
exploit precise values for their energy and momentum.  It can therefore do little more than establish the need for 
causality in the classical limit.  See for example Collins [1977], pp11-12.  The analyticity postulate is further 
discussed in Redhead [1980], section 7. 
29 That is, the amplitude functions are assumed meromorphic; the basic point here is just that they contain none 




                                            
30 See Chew [1962], p31. 31 “The forces producing a certain reaction are due to the intermediate states that occur in the two ‘crossed’ reactions belonging to the same diagram.  The range of a given part of the force is determined by the mass of the intermediate state producing it, and the strength of the force by the matrix elements connecting that state to the initial and final states of the crossed reaction.” Chew [1962], p32. 
32 Note that this improvement on Heisenberg’s original S-matrix theory is predicated on an explicit formal 
analogy with a result from the rival QFT (in terms of which both the Born approximation and the Yukawa 
interaction were originally formulated.)  Whether S-matrix theory could have been a feasible approach to 
particle physics without a significant amount of borrowing from QFT seems highly doubtful, but it is not the 
success of S-matrix theorists in their ambition of providing a genuine alternative to QFT that occupies me here. 
33 In case of confusion, I emphasize that this applies only at the level of types, not tokens. 






                                            




                                            
36 Of course two types of composite particles, bound states and resonances, are recognized by particle physics.  The difference between the two is that resonances have a mass greater than or equal to the mass of the particles which go into the reaction from which it arises, and bound states have a mass less than the masses of the input particles.  This entails an important practical difference between the two, since only resonances can be observed in scattering process such as the one sketched above (though note that the 
bound state contribution to the observed amplitude can nevertheless be detected: see Chew [1966], p99, footnote, 
for references). But since it is simply one of stability, in particle physics in general the distinction is not considered fundamental. In keeping with Chew’s usage, we therefore subsume both types of composite particles under the banner of ‘bound states’. 
37 A discussion of the S-matrix concept of composite particles from a metaphysical point of view, and with an 





                                            
38 This assumes that binding energies are limitless – an assumption reflected in the range of the integral in      
(Eq.1). 
39 Lewis [1991], p5. 
40 Ibid. p22. 
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ontological footing and hence all equally ‘natural’.  Hence there is no reason to be dissatisfied with the enormous variety of decompositions on offer: it is nothing unusual, and in the absence of fundamental or otherwise privileged parts it cannot in any case be avoided.  It is, however, crucial to note that a composite particle is emphatically not simply a ‘fusion’ of its constituents (to quote a term by which composition is often described in analytic metaphysics).  The constituents must be interacting with one another by means of particle exchange in order for a bound state to form, for otherwise we have only free particles.  The bound state exists for only so long as these interactions take place.   We are now in a position to sketch a definition of ‘parthood’ in S‐matrix theory and show that it partially orders the set of hadrons.  From the definition of a hadron as “a bound state of those channels with which it communicates”, we know there are two necessary conditions on being a constituent of a token composite particle: x is a 








                                            







                                            
42 I would like to stress again that even although a partial order – that which is simply assumed in standard 
philosophical mereology - has been arrived at, we did not get to this point by a priori speculation.  Rather, we obtained this result by following through the logic of sui generis principles of physical composition that are to be found in this theory of nuclear physics. 
43 Chew [1964a], p34 (though this quote is repeated verbatim in countless other places). 






                                            
45 See  Cushing [1990], p132. 
46 Chew [1971b], p2334; Likewise, Chew writes of electromagnetism: “Whether one speaks of the photon or of 
the electromagnetic fields, there exists an a priori central component of the theory whose existence is accepted 







                                            
47 Veneziano [1969], p35. 
48 Chew [1971b], p2331.  Likewise, for Chew “it is pointless to seek the origin” of why useful functions usually 














                                            
49 Chew [1970], p23. 
50 A major shortcoming of the theory was that the properties of isospin and hypercharge encoded in the SU(3) 
flavour algebra could not be explained, all speculative talk of ‘bootstrapping symmetries’ aside.  
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It would be surprising if all the poles could be specified arbitrarily.  For instance suppose we include the neutron and proton poles in the S‐matrix.  We would then expect the deuteron pole to be generated by the ‘force’ between these two particles, so there should be no need to put it in beforehand.  Our expectation about this is clearly based on the feeling that the deuteron is a composite particle, and that composites should be consequences of the theory, not part of the postulates.  In quantum‐electrodynamics one has to specify the masses and charges of the electron and positron, but not those of positronium, which can be calculated.  To add to the theory the requirement that the positronium mass take some particular value other than the experimental one would certainly be inconsistent.  A theory of strong interactions which enables one to specify the masses and couplings of all the particles arbitrarily is almost certainly similarly contradictory.51  It is here that we meet the connection that S‐matrix theorists forged between fundamentality and consistency.  Where we have composite particles, their properties should be deducible from the theory; stipulating some value for them and putting it in by hand is very likely to result in inconsistent results. In the limiting case in which all particles are composite, as was Chew’s belief, the inference seems to be that no parameters should be arbitrary and all should be derivable from the others in a self‐consistent or ‘bootstrapping’ way.   As a textbook put it,   Intuitively, it seems clear that if all the hadrons are to be composites of each other, and all the forces are due to the exchange of particles, then some form of self consistency is necessary…52  But if we want an example of a theory that feasibly provides the requisite degree of self‐consistency, then the S‐matrix fits the bill if anything does: the constraints imposed on 
                                            
51 Collins and Squires [1968] p33, italics added. 








                                            
53 This reaction is particularly simple because it is ‘closed under crossing’, i.e. all channel obtained by crossing 
are identical. 
54 Omnès [1971], p300. 




                                            
56 Chew [1964a], p34. 
57 As one textbook puts it, “solutions of the unitarity equation involves solution of infinite sets of coupled, non‐linear, singular, integral equations… one would have to solve the entire strong‐interaction problem in one fell swoop.”Collins and Squires [1968], p140.  Of course, approximations could be and were made in 
deriving predictions, though their validity was often largely unknown. 
58 See Chew [1966], p60, for a discussion of the experimental evidence. 
59 “Requiring that the amplitude satisfy maximal analyticity of the first kind, with all the singularities given by 
the Landau-Cutkosky equations, is not necessarily sufficient to determine it completely.  It would be sufficient if 
it were known to vanish suitably at infinity, but otherwise subtractions, which may introduce arbitrary 





                                            
60 Chew [1966] p40.   
61 See Barone and Predazzi [2002] , p.87 for a modern presentation of these issues.   
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had studied in detail only a few years before.62  What he had shown was that the partial wave amplitudes had singularities in the complex angular momentum plane at physical (integral or half‐integral) values, and that such poles were ‘moving poles’ (i.e. functions of the energy).  The angular momenta of bound states of systems which were solutions of the Schrodinger equation were thereby shown to be connected by smooth functions or ‘Regge trajectories’, denoted by α(E), and the incorporation of complex angular momenta into scattering theory has since been referred to (and is well known) as ‘Regge theory’.  Its applicability in the context of the strong interactions was essentially a conjecture, since there was no equation of motion whose analyticity properties could be explicitly studied.  But this conjecture both helped in solving in an elegant way a number of theoretical difficulties and – most importantly – was also sustained by a rich edifice of phenomenological evidence. Furthermore, it was with its assimilation that the companion notions of arbitrariness, compositeness, and analyticity finally traced out an articulated set of relationships.  The new postulate that the amplitudes should admit continuation in angular momentum (ℓ) presupposes that the amplitudes should be analytic functions of ℓ.  ‘Maximal analyticity’ is understood in the case of angular momentum perfectly analogously to the case of linear momentum: the amplitude should admit continuation to complex ℓ‐values with only such singularities as are demanded by unitarity.  This sixth postulate of maximal analyticity of the second kind was therefore a natural extension of the postulate already present, and its inclusion completed the architecture of the S‐matrix.     The story that begs to be told here is rather long and detailed, but here we shall have to content ourselves with just the crucial steps in the reasoning surrounding the incorporation of the postulate and the subsequent empirical and metaphysical implications.63  The postulate of maximal analyticity amounts to the hypothesis that the partial wave amplitudes can be analytically continued to complex ℓ for all physical (real and integral or half‐integral) ℓ.  Now, it can be demonstrated that an analytic function 
                                            
62 Regge [1959], [1960]. 






                                            
64“The [original] pole-particle correspondence fails to distinguish between ‘elementary’ and composite’ particles, 
but… Fraustchi and I conjectured that Regge asymptotic behaviour might be used in the relativistic hadron S-





                                            
65  “The key problem of bootstrap dynamics is to find a technique of continuing that Froissart-Gribov formula 
down to values of angular momentum for which poles appear.  Not general technique has yet been developed.” 
(Chew [1966], p60.) 
66 Some progress on this issue was made, but the argument was long and complicated and in any case only 
applied to elastic processes. See for example the discussion of Martin’s proof in Collins and Squires [1968], 
p141.   
67 “Assuming analyticity in s, the Froissart limit evidently precludes such a special status for any physical [ℓ] 
larger than 1, but to date the general principles [so far introduced] have not been shown to ensure that these 
three lowest [ℓ]  values must be ordinary citizens in a nuclear democracy.  … It may eventually develop that 
complete democracy is the only way to achieve maximal analyticity of the first degree.  Currently, however, it 
seems necessary to invoke an additional postulate.” (Chew [1966], p54.) 
68 Ibid., p55. 
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amongst them, it also renders the anti‐fundamentalist hypothesis directly empirically testable.    The reasons for this are the following.  As we have noted, maximal analyticity implies that the angular momentum is a continuous function of the energy, and as the energy increases a pole at a given value of ℓ moves along on its trajectory α(E).  Hence poles that contribute to one wave are functionally related to poles in others.  This gives rise to distinctive asymptotic behaviour by Regge poles: it implies that it is the leading singularity in the crossed channel t that governs the asymptotic behaviour of the amplitude A(s,t) as the direct channel energy s goes to infinity. On the other hand, poles that contribute to only one partial wave (and hence which are not Regge poles) give rise to delta‐function type singularities and lack this behaviour.  Being non–Regge, these poles can be taken as candidates for those corresponding to elementary particles.69  Therefore it could be said that    since bound states clearly lie on Regge trajectories whilst CDD [i.e. non‐Regge] poles, in particular partial waves, give rise to Kronecker delta singularities in [the partial wave amplitudes], Regge theory offers a precise way of distinguishing between composite and elementary particles, and therefore of testing the idea of nuclear democracy that there are no elementary particles.70   Thus it is the postulate of maximal analyticity upon which Regge theory rests that results in the testability of nuclear democracy.  And Chew did indeed stake his entire anti‐fundamentalist capital on the hope that the Regge asymptotic prediction would prevail over the rival fundamentalist delta‐function.   Thus there exists at least one possible path for experimental demolition of the hadronic bootstrap: the discovery of non‐Regge poles among hadrons.71 
                                            
69 For a more precise discussion of the relationship, see Jacob and Chew [1964a], pp.121-123. 
70 Squires [1971], p74.   





                                            
72 Chew [1967], p189; see also Cushing [1990], p164.   
73  Of course, in reality things are rarely regarded as so simple.  Cushing’s interpretation of the demise of the 
‘autonomous S-matrix programme’ is due to “degenerating Regge phenomenology” and exemplifies a 
“degenerating research programme in Lakatos’ sense of that word” (Cushing [1990,] p154).  Likewise, 
according to Redhead “the bootstrap programme was not so much refuted as overtaken by the new 
fundamentalist approach involving involving truly basic constituents like quarks and gluons” ([2005], p.573).  
While these are no doubt accurate assessements of the history, given Chew’s insistence that non-Regge poles 
represented the ‘demolition’ of the theory and the argument underpinning it, I think we can hazard that these 
experiments may be taken to have a far more destructive significance for the claims of the programme than they 
perhaps in practice did.  In any case, little of any consequence for our purposes hangs on this (doubtlessly naive) 
impression.  (Note that other avenues of refutation were also envisaged as possible, such as the violation of the 
Levinson theorem regarding the high-energy phase shifts.  See Collins and Squires ([1968], p145), and Jacob 




                                            
74 Of course, today we do know that all hadrons are composite (indeed now ‘hadrons’ are now usually defined 
as those particles that are composed of quarks); we don’t know whether the quarks they are composed of have 
further structure or not.  But this of course is compatible with the falsity of the S-matrix proposition that all 




                                            
75 Such a world is conjectured and described by David Bohm ([1957], chapter 5). 
76 As Veneziano puts it, “It could be that we have an infinite variety of particles that interact with each other in a 
small region of space... in such a way as to form bound (or resonating) states that possess again the properties of 
the constituents” ([1969], p36.  (Quoted in Gale [1974].) 
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